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CONSENTABILITY, AUTONOMY, AND SELF­
ACTUALIZATION 
Jonathan Witmer-Rich 
Nancy Kim's Consentability provides a fascinating exploration 
of the many thorny problems in consent theory and practice-such 
as whether individuals should be permitted to voluntarily inflict 
self-harm, and whether they should be permitted to sell body parts 
or personal (body-based) services. Kim articulates several 
principles designed to help decision-makers understand and 
evaluate whether and how consent can operate in these arenas and 
others. Her contributions include the Regret Principle and. 
evaluating consent's impact on Future Autonomy. 
In this response essay, I will engage with Kim's contributions 
by focusing on the competing principles underlying consent. These 
include: 




2. 	 protecting a right to autonomy grounded on an 





3. 	 protecting a right to autonomy grounded on the 
value of self-actualization and self-governing 
("Self-Actualization") 
Kim, relying on foundational authorities such as J.S. Mill and Joel 
Feinberg, articulates and puts to good use all of these conceptions. 
I offer several points in response to Kim. First, I contend that 
clearly delineating the overlapping but distinct principles that 
underlie consent is critical for any conceptual project, like Kim's, 
seeking to propose a framework for consent. Second, I argue that 
clearly adopting one (or more) of those distinct principles would 
help guide decision-making in hard cases. Third, throughout this 
response I will argue that promoting the good of Self­
75 
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Actualization-as articulated by Joseph Raz-is the most 
appealing and valuable way for the law to evaluate consent. 
This essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I will follow Kim's 
lead in articulating the various foundational principles that might 
underlie the normative power of consent. Here I highlight how 
these foundational principles contain substantial overlap, which 
often leads commentators to use them interchangeably, but 
emphasize how these overlapping principles are different in crucial 
respects. In Parts II and III, I will illustrate how these conceptual 
distinctions matter by turning to two of Kim's central rubrics for 
consentability: Impacts on Future Autonomy, and the "Regret 
Principle." 




Various underlying justifications for consent overlap 
substantially, but still represent fundamentally different versions 
of consent. Carefully distinguishing among these underlying 
conceptions prevents us from silently shifting our arguments from 
one to the other, and lays bare the value choices to be made in 
formulating the law of consent. 
The first distinction is that between autonomy and self­
interest. In her conclusion, Kim notes that "[t]he purpose of 
consent it to empower individuals, to give them a tool with which 
to exercise autonomy and maximize their self-interest."1 These two 
values--exercising autonomy and maximizing self-interest-are 
very frequently in accord. Increasing an individual's autonomy 
often also enables her to maximize her self-interest. Likewise, 
empowering an individual to maximize her own self-interest often 
increases and promotes her individual autonomy. Kim discusses 
both concepts throughout her book.2 
At the same time, self-interest and autonomy are different 
values, and in hard cases they can result in different analyses and 
outcomes. Autonomy is about the ability to make choices-which 
can include making bad choices that diminish one's own interests. 
A person who freely and voluntarily chooses an option that 
conflicts with her own interests has nevertheless acted 
autonomously. Maximizing self-interest, in contrast, is not just 
1. NANCY 8. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 218 (2019). 
2. See id. at 15, 41, 53-55, 74-78. 
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about the ability to make the choice, but about evaluating the 
outcome of that choice-did it serve the chooser's self-interest? 
Kim discusses, as one concrete example, individuals who seek 
serious modifications of their own bodies, such as through breast 
enhancement surgery or elective amputation. 3 If our fundamental 
value is autonomy, we might choose to respect individuals' 
decisions to elect severe and permanent body modifications, even 
if we have grave doubts about whether those choices will serve 
their long-term interests. In contrast, if our fundamental value is 
protecting and furthering each individual's self-interest, we might 
intervene to restrict their autonomous choice when we have 
sufficiently serious concerns about harm to their long-term 
interests. 
John Stuart Mill famously argued that insofar as we seek to 
maximize individuals' self-interest, we should defer to their own 
judgment. Kim quotes Mill, who argues that an individual's 
"voluntary choice is evidence that what he chooses is desirable, or 
at the least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best 
provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing 
it."4 Mill argues this point further: the community's interest in an 
individual "is fractional, and altogether indirect: while, with 
respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary 
man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing 
those that can be possessed by any one else."5 When the state or 
community judges what is best for an individual's own interests, 
that judgment "must be grounded on general presumptions; which 
may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to 
be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted 
with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at 
them merely from without."6 Accordingly, "in each person's own 
concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise .... 
All errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning, 
are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him 
to what they deem his good."7 
Mill's claim is here somewhat contingent--contingent on the 
idea that an individual is, in fact, the best judge of their own 
3. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 22-32, 175-187 
(2019). 
4. Id. at 91 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 110 (1859)). 
5. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 70 (1859). 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 71. 
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interests. As Mill states, it may often be the case that each 
individual will better judge, compared with some third party such 
as the state, what will best serve their own self-interest. But there 
may also be cases in which that self-interest is better served by 
limiting the individual's own (faulty) decision-making in favor of 
the decision-making of some third party (possibly the state). 
Embracing the fundamental principle of "protecting each 
individual's self-interest" means we must be open to at least 
evaluating the argument, in given cases, that certain choices are 
very likely to harm an individual's self-interest rather than 
advance it. Further, this principle also suggests that at times, 
allowing the state (or some other third party) to direct certain 
decisions will better serve that individual's self-interest. 
Instead of focusing on self-interest, we might instead choose 
to be centrally concerned with protecting individual autonomy. If 
we focus on autonomy, and not maximizing self-interest, we will 
reject arguments that appeal primarily to protecting individuals 
from their own bad judgment. As a value distinct from self­
interest, autonomy-the right and ability to choose-would appear 
to protect an individual's right to choose poorly as well as to choose 
wisely. 
In addition to separating the concepts of "autonomy" and "self­
interest," the concept of autonomy itself can be conceptualized in 
several different distinct manners, and these differing conceptions 
again push us in different directions in hard cases. As Kim 
recognizes, "[a]utonomy, like consent, is a multi-faceted concept."8 
By calling autonomy "multi-faceted," Kim invokes Joel 
Feinberg's incisive discussion of the many different values that 
autonomy can serve to vindicate. These include: 
• 	 "the capacity to govern oneself or competence"9 
• 	 "the condition of self-government," for "[a]n 
autonomous individual ... is authentic to himself and 
self-directed"10 
• 	 "an ideal of character" that "derives from the 
condition of self-government and includes virtues 
8. NANCY 8. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 53 (2019). 
9. Id. (citing JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 27-51 (1986)). 
10. 	 Id. at 53-54. 
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such as self-reliance, personal responsibility, moral 
authenticity and integrity"11 
• 	 "sovereign authority to govern oneself or the 'right' to 
personal sovereignty"12 
Relatedly, Kim cites JS Mill for the proposition that "the goal 
of freedom was utility," in the '"largest sense, grounded on the 
permanent interests of man as a progressive being."' 13 The concept 
of "man as a progressive being" is based on the concept that it is 
important "not only what men do, but also what manner of men 
they are that do it."14 
Joseph Raz has further articulated this idea. Raz argues that 
we value an individual's choices because "[a]utonomy is a 
constituent element of the good life."15 Raz embraces the view that 
"it is the function of governments to promote morality," and that 
"[m]orality is thought to be concerned with the advancement of the 
well-being of individuals."16 Individual well-being, in turn, 
"consists in [the individual's] successful pursuit of valuable, 
willingly embraced goals."17 
For Raz, individual well-being requires that the individual 
"adopt and pursue goals because [she] believes in their 
independent value."18 "Autonomy means that a good life is a life 
which is a free creation."19 The "concern for autonomy is a concern 
to enable people to have a good life."20 
In contrast with this view of autonomy as based on self­
actualization and self-government, autonomy can instead be 
conceptualized as simply reflecting individual self-sovereignty. 
This self-sovereignty view has been most vigorously advanced by 
Joel Feinberg. He argues that "sovereignty is basic and 
underivative. Sovereignty is, in a sense, an ultimate source of 
authority."21 Feinberg explains that "to say that I am sovereign 
11. 	 NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 54 (2019). 
12. 	 Id. 
13. 	 Id. (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 24 (1859)). 
14. 	 Id. (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 24 (1859)). 
15. 	 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 408 (1986). 
16. 	 Id. at 415, 267. 
17. 	 Id. at 288. 
18. 	 Id. at 308. 
19. 	 Id. at 412. 
20. 	 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 412 (1986). 
21. 	 3 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 48 (1986). 
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over my bodily territory is to say that I, and I alone, decide (so long 
as I am capable of deciding) what goes on there."22 Just as state 
sovereignty is ''basic and underivative," Feinberg views the 
individual's right to autonomy as a "right of self-determination" 
that is "entirely underiuatiue, as morally basic as the good of self­
fulfillment itself."23 "The life that a person threatens by his own 
rashness is after all his life; it belongs to him and to no one else. 
For that reason alone, he must be the one to decide-for better or 
worse-what is to be done with it in that private realm where the 
interests of others are not involved."24 
Feinberg recognizes that this conception of "sovereign 
autonomy" has significant implications for the relationship 
between the values of autonomy and liberty. If self-sovereignty is 
a deontological value-an underivative birthright-then a 
sovereign person may choose to sell or alienate some or all of her 
physical body or her liberty. Feinberg acknowledges that while 
"freedom is an important good in human life .... [i]t is very 
important to recognize that freedom is one kind of good among 
many, that persons have been known to get along well with very 
little of it, and that rational persons are often willing to 'trade' 
large amounts of it for goods of other kinds, including simple 
contentment."25 Accordingly, "[t]he dejure autonomous person will 
surely reserve the right to 'trade off his de facto freedoms for goods 
of other kinds, as measured on his own scale of values and 
determined by his own judgments."26 
Kim rejects this outcome, arguing that "[t]he fact that a 
person has control over his or her body is not the same thing as 
being the 'owner' of it, which necessarily implies something 
external to the self and which can be traded."27 Kim quotes JS 
Mill's famous argument that respecting a person's voluntary 
choices does not entail allowing that person to forego that liberty, 
for example by selling part of her body or liberty. As Mill states, 
"the reason for not interfering ... with a person's voluntary 
acts ... is concern for his liberty."28 "But by selling himself a slave, 
he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it, beyond 
22. 3 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 53 (1986). 
23. Id. at 59. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 65. 
26. Id. 
27. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 41 (2019). 
28. Id. at 91 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 184 (1859)). 
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that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very 
purpose which is the justification of allowing to dispose of 
himself."29 
For Feinberg, in contrast, "[t]here is no paradox ... when a 
morally autonomous person exercises his sovereign right of self­
government to diminish his own de facto freedom of action."30 
When we think of state sovereignty, Feinberg explains that "there 
is neither conceptual nor (necessarily) moral difficulty when a 
political state renounces some part of its sovereignty."31 
Accordingly, "[i]f we transfer the whole concept of sovereignty from 
the nation to the person, then we should expect the same 
implications for the personal forfeiture of autonomy."32 For 
Feinberg-but not for Kim-''[a] perfectly autonomous person 
would have in Mill's words the 'power of voluntarily disposing of 
his own lot in life,' even if that involved forfeiture of his de facto 
freedom in the future."33 
Having canvassed these authorities offering different 
conceptions of why consent and autonomy are valuable, Kim does 
not definitively embrace any one theory (or combination of 
theories). Rather, she articulates what she refers to as a more 
''literal" definition of autonomy as "freedom to move, act or think 
without assistance or constraint."34 I will consider this definition 
of autonomy, and further explore the competing underlying 
justifications for consent, in the course of discussing two of Kim's 
major contributions-a focus on Future Autonomy and the Regret 
Principle. 
II. CONSENTABILITY AND FUTURE AUTONOMY 
One of Kim's major principles for evaluating consentability is 
assessing that choice's impact on the individual's future autonomy. 
Kim creates a hierarchy of autonomy interests and explains that it 
serves as a "hierarchy of which interests if violated would most 
diminish the future selfs options by constraining the future selfs 
freedom to act and think independently."35 The question of "future 
29. NANCY s. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 91 (2019) (quoting 
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 184 (1859)). 
30. 3 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 65 (1986). 
31. Id. at 70. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 69. 
34. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 74 (2019). 
35. Id. at 76. 
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autonomy" is thus a central guiding principle throughout the 
book.36 
Turning back to the underlying justifications for consent, 
Kim's "future autonomy" principle appears to be grounded in the 
importance of autonomy as opposed to self-interest. Her hierarchy 
is not based on assessing which interests, if violated, would 
diminish the future selfs self-interests, but rather future 
autonomy. 
The next logical question is which conception of autonomy 
Kim is concerned with-autonomy as self-sovereignty, autonomy 
as self-actualization, or something different? Kim explains her 
hierarchy as follows: 
[A] proposed activity would pose a threat to the consenter's 
autonomy if it would limit the consenter's capacity to act and 
think independently and without assistance. Under this 
definition, a decision which provides more opportunities and 
options for the consenter enhances autonomy, while one that 
reduces them diminishes autonomy. This definition for the 
purpose of determining the threat level to autonomy differs 
from other definitions which focus on self-actualization.37 
The more literal, less conceptually rich nature of Kim's 
definition of autonomy comes at a cost-a loss of depth and nuance 
in application. For many individuals, projects of self-actualization 
and self-formation commonly involve creating bonds that 
significantly constrain our future selves. A young man's decision 
to enter the priesthood entails accepting substantial restrictions 
on his future selfs freedom to make other choices related to 
vocation, intimate relationships, and fathering children, among 
many others. But voluntarily accepting those burdens is part and 
parcel of what makes joining the priesthood such an important and 
profound vocational choice. Becoming a priest has a social and 
religious depth and weight that far outweighs many other 
vocational choices, such as choosing to become a car salesman for 
a few years. The latter profession offers much greater future 
36. See NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 74 (2019) 
("Given the unpredictability and irrationality of human behavior, acts which limit 
future capacity may promote one's present autonomy but risk limiting one's future 
autonomy. 'J; id. at 121 ("These human fallibilities impair decision-making and may 
lead to regretted actions which impair future autonomy."). 
37. Id. at 74. 
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freedom and flexibility-and, partly as a consequence, may be less 
deeply meaningful. 
Many significant choices in life are like this. Pursuing a 
serious and deeply meaningful path-such as choosing a serious 
career, choosing to marry, or choosing to have (or not to have) 
children-are all decisions that open up certain future options 
while foreclosing many others. A serious commitment to life-long 
intimate partnership with one person entails abandoning 
countless other future relationships, and yet also opens up the 
opportunity for a relationship with a depth far beyond what any of 
those many short-term relationships could provide. 
Kim's version of autonomy means that "a decision which 
provides more opportunities and options for the consenter 
enhances autonomy, while one that reduces them diminishes 
autonomy."38 With respect to many important life decisions, it is 
not clear that this framework is helpful or desirable. It may not be 
helpful because the "opportunities and options" created by one 
choice versus the other may be very difficult to assess or compare. 
It may not be desirable because some choices that seem, on 
balance, to reduce future "opportunities and options"-such as 
entering the priesthood, or committing to life-long marriage-are 
valuable choices of self-actualization, even if they limit more 
superficial "opportunities and options." 
Instead of embracing "self-actualization" as the core value 
underlying autonomy, Kim could instead embrace Joel Feinberg's · 
conception that an individual's right to autonomy flows directly 
from his or her self-sovereignty. After all, "[t]he life that a person 
threatens by his own rashness is after all his life; it belongs to him 
and to no one else."39 The most striking aspect of Feinberg's 
"autonomy as self-sovereignty" conception is the degree to which it 
resists external assessments of whether the individual is 
benefiting in some way from their autonomy. With Mill's "self­
interest" conception, the central question is whether the 
individual's choices are serving their self-interest. But from a 
perspective of self-sovereignty or self-ownership, in contrast, there 
is little room to assess whether the state of being autonomous is 
"good for" the individual or not. She is not autonomous in virtue of 
the benefit it bestows on her, and thus she remains autonomous 
38. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 74 (2019). 
39. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 59 
(1986). 
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even if no benefit can be found. Kim rejects this outcome, arguing 
that "[t]he fact that a person has control over his or her body is not 
the same thing as being the 'owner' of it, which necessarily implies 
something external to the self and which can be traded."40 
In contrast with Kim's more ''literal" definition of autonomy, 
Joseph Raz powerfully makes the case that self-actualization-the 
ongoing human project of creating and embodying coherent and 
meaningful values and choices-is the most fundamental good of 
autonomy, and is the good that society should seek to further in 
the law of consent. If so, then furthering and protecting that right 
to self-actualization is more important-more fundamental-than 
the literal freedom to think, act, and move without assistance. 
Under autonomy as self-actualization, decisions should not be 
judged according to whether they will constrain a future selfs 
freedom to move, act, or think, but rather whether those decisions 
are part of the process of developing and embodying one's own 
values and goals. 
In this regard, Raz identifies four conditions of personal well­
being. First, well-being "consist[s] of the successfully pursuit of 
goals which [the individual] has or should have." Second, the 
individual "adopt[s] and pursue[s] goals because [she] believes in 
their independent value." Third, an individual's "well-being 
depends, at the deepest level, on his action reasons and his success 
in following them." Fourth, "a person's well-being depends to a 
large extent on success in socially defined and determined pursuits 
and activities."41 
These criteria provide a basis to evaluate individual decision­
making that perhaps better captures what matters to us about our 
autonomy than simply the ability to move, act, or think without 
assistance or constraint. 
III. THE REGRET PRINCIPLE 
Another major component of Kim's conceptual project is what 
she deems the "Regret Principle." She argues that consentability 
should be limited based on the consenting party's future regret. In 
particular, Kim explains, "[t]he regret which is the focus of this 
book has a permanent negative effect on our happiness and well­
being because it limits or damages our future autonomy in a 
40. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 41 (2019). 
41. JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 308-09 (1988). 
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significant way."42 Kim argues "that the state should intervene to 
minimize or avoid this type of profound regret, which I will refer to 
as the Regret Principle."43 This Regret Principle illuminates a 
central tension in consent theory, between decisions today and 
impacts of those decisions tomorrow, and offers guidance on how to 
navigate that tension. 
Here Kim starts with the common liberal premise that "[i]n a 
free society, the government should respect individual autonomy 
and restrict very little between consenting adults."44 This does, of 
course, require that the state must "ensure that both adults are 
actually consenting."45 
Drawing on social psychology and behavioral economics, Kim 
stresses the "myriad ways in which [human cognitive processing] 
can fail to serve the best interests of the decision-maker," and also 
the reality that "human beings are highly susceptible to social 
influence, context and pressure."46 Social science research "has 
revealed that human beings are prone to heuristics and biases, 
have difficulty assessing very complex information, make 
impulsive or ill-considered choices under time constraints, and are 
manipulable and subject to social pressures."47 These problems, 
Kim claims, "may lead to regretted actions which impair future 
autonomy."48 All of this, Kim argues, suggests that "the foundation 
upon which much of the thinking about autonomy was based is 
cracked and crumbling."49 
As with the Future Autonomy principle, Kim's Regret 
Principle can be usefully interrogated by returning to the different 
underlying purposes of consent articulated above. Her criticisms 
of individual decision-making, based on the flaws and biases 
evident in human decision-making, seem to operate under the 
"Self-Interest" framework. Her criticisms reflect a concern about 
whether individual consent is advancing self-interest-whether 
individuals are, indeed, the best judge of their own interests. She 
argues, for example, that the failures in human decision-making 
show that individual decisions "can fail to serve the best interests 
42. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 57 (2019). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 117. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
4 7. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 121 (2019). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 117. 
86 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 66 
of the decision-maker."50 This is an argument most explicitly about 
self-interest, not autonomy. Yet at other points Kim appears to 
focus not on self-interest as such, but on autonomy. For example, 
she argues that the problems of human decision-making "may lead 
to regretted actions which impair future autonomy."51 
If we care fundamentally about the value of autonomy for 
furthering self-government and self-actualization, we will view 
Kim's list of human frailties differently, and it is less evident that 
those problems mean that the foundation of autonomy "is cracked 
and crumbling."52 Autonomy as "Self-Actualization" is based on 
the idea that "[a]n autonomous individual ... is authentic to 
himself and self-directed."53 Relatedly, the state of being 
autonomous promotes a certain "ideal of character" that "includes 
virtues such as self-reliance, personal responsibility, moral 
authenticity and integrity."54 
The problems with individual decision-making that Kim 
catalogues call into question whether individual decisions always 
"serve the best interests of the decision-maker,"55 but they do not 
necessarily undermine the values of Self-Actualization. Even if my 
decisions can be flawed by self-deception and cognitive bias, by 
choosing autonomously I am nevertheless developing my own 
character as a choosing moral agent-developing my self-reliance, 
embodying the moral authenticity and integrity that comes from 
being responsible for my own choices. 
Likewise, if we adopt Feinberg's view that autonomy is 
grounded on Self-Sovereignty, we again would have less reason to 
conclude that the frailties of human decision-making were eroding 
the foundations of consent and autonomy. Self-Sovereignty is not 
based on the presupposition that individuals make good and 
unbiased decisions about their own interests, but rather on the 
view that "[t]he life that a person threatens by his own rashness is 
after all his life; it belongs to him and to no one else. For that 
reason alone, he must be the one to decide-for better or worse-­
50. NANCY 8. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 117 (2019). 
51. Id. at 121. 
52. Id. at 117. 
53. Id. at 54. 
54. Id. 
55. NANCY 8. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 117 (2019). 
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what is to be done with it in that private realm where the interests 
of others are not involved."56 
Accordingly, it is worth questioning whether Kim is in fact 
primarily interested in advancing each individual's self-interests, 
or whether she is primarily interested in impairments of future 
autonomy. Individual regret is ordinarily thought of as related to 
errors about self-interest, but not necessarily about impairments 
to autonomy. 
Profound regret about a past decision often reflects a present 
judgment that a past decision-such as the choice to pursue one 
career rather than another-failed to correctly serve one's self­
interest. I might experience profound regret because I chose to be 
a lawyer, when in retrospect I believe I would have been so much 
happier as a dentist. Knowing what I know now, I understand­
in a way that my past self did not-that the practice of law does 
not serve my self-interests, because it does not fit my personality 
traits. In contrast, I would be much happier working as a dentist. 
This type of regret is based on a diminution of my own self­
int'erest, but it does not represent an impairment to, or violation 
of, my autonomy. To the contrary, my decision to be a lawyer may 
have been fully voluntary and autonomous--entirely my own 
decision. This regret does not stem from any autonomy violation 
(past, present, or future), but from a frank self-realization that 
one's own prior, fully voluntary decisions badly served one's own 
self-interests. This is perhaps the most bitter type of regret, as 
there is no one else to blame but your (past) self. 
At other times, I might view some results negatively not so 
much because a decision failed to serve my self-interests, but 
because of violations to my own autonomy. Here too, however, 
there is a difference between regret about past autonomy 
impairments and regret about past decisions that have led to 
future autonomy impairments. 
I might regret the fact that I became a lawyer rather than a 
dentist due to the fact that my parents insisted that I attend law 
school rather than dental school, and went so far as to agree to pay 
for law school while refusing to pay for dental school. This, I might 
argue, impaired my past autonomy-my freedom of decision­
making. This sort of misfortune, however, is often described with 
56. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 59 
(1986). 
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terms like resentment or anger rather than "regret." I may have 
amassed material wealth and comfort as a result of my legal career 
(my material interests were well-served), while still suffering a 
bitter anger that my parents so heavily impaired by past decision­
making (my autonomy was violated). 
Kim yokes these different problems together when she 
contends that "[t]hese human fallibilities impair decision-making 
and may lead to regretted actions which impair future 
autonomy."57 But (1) "regretted actions" and (2) "impair[ed] future 
autonomy" are separate concerns. It is not clear whether Kim's 
Regret Principle requires both future regret and impairment to 
future autonomy. Possibly, Kim is simply claiming that future 
regrets are commonly associated with impairments to future 
autonomy. In any event, it is worth emphasizing that these two 
concerns are separate. 
There is thus a tension, in some cases, between Kim's concerns 
of "Regret" and "Future Autonomy Impairments." One way to limit 
future regret is for the state (or some other third party or 
institution) to intervene in individual decision-making to prevent 
choices that badly serve our own interests while fostering (or 
forcing) choices that advance those self-interests. This would often 
entail an autonomy violation to present, and also perhaps to 
future, autonomy-while at the same time minimizing future 
regret. 
In contrast, greater protections for individual autonomy often 
create greater opportunities for regret. The project of autonomous 
self-actualization is meaningful, in part, because of the genuine 
opportunities for mistakes or failures. The visionary artist-a 
paradigm of individual self-actualization-may end up finding 
great meaning and satisfaction in creating works of art that inspire 
generations. Or she may end up isolated, unrecognized, and a 
failure. 
Returning to Raz's "Self-Actualization" concept, individual 
choices can be valuable because they allow each of us to live a life 
of our own choosing, to adopt values and goals and then live a life 
as a responsible moral agent in pursuit of those values and goals. 
This may result in regrets-choices that failed to achieve the 
desired successes. But regret is, in a sense, part and parcel of 
living one's own life, being allowed to choose, create one's own 
57. NANCY 8. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 121 (2019). 
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identity, and be the sort of being that has authorship and agency 
over one's own life. This is, perhaps, worthier of moral valuation 
than the brute fact of self-ownership, and more worthwhile than 
simple advancement of self-interest. 
* * * 
This response has only engaged with a few of the myriad 
concepts and practical applications contained in Consentability. 
Kim's book engages productively with many additional areas, such 
as private contract, fraud and deception, and reducing 
opportunism. On the specific concepts addressed in this essay, 
hopefully it is evident from the discussion above that Kim's work 
is a serious and deeply-informed effort to grapple with the 
complexities of consent and autonomy, and offers a mix of 
conceptual tools that help sharpen and illuminate the boundaries 
and limitations of consent. 
